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T
he federal government created the
Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie
Mac) to enhance the availability of mort-
gage credit by providing stability and
liquidity to the secondary mortgage market.
1 These
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) have
become significant players in the mortgage markets
generally and dominate the “conforming” mortgage
market.
2 Their size and mission have given the fed-
eral government an ongoing interest in their finan-
cial stability. In terms of asset size, if both GSEs
were bank holding companies, Fannie Mae would
be the second-largest banking organization in the
United States, and Freddie Mac would be the fifth-
largest (as of the end of the third quarter of
2001). Moreover, with the diminished issuance of
U.S. Treasury securities in recent years, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac are trying to establish “bench-
mark” debt issues that can be used by investors for
pricing other securities and as hedging instruments.
3
To the extent that the GSEs are successful, these
efforts would not only reduce their financing costs but
also add to their importance to financial markets.
The government’s interest in Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac is not limited to their important role to
financial markets. Like the largest commercial banks,
the GSEs are thought by many investors to benefit
from an implicit government guarantee. That is, if
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one of them failed, the government would likely step
in to protect at least some creditors. Investors’ per-
ceptions of an implicit guarantee for large banks’
uninsured creditors stems both from banks’ per-
ceived importance to the financial system and from
past actions. In the case of the GSEs, the belief in an
implicit guarantee arises from these organizations’
unique relationship to the federal government, their
importance to financial markets, and the federal
government’s past handling of GSE problems.
4
Government guarantees of liabilities, explicit or
implicit, not only put taxpayers at risk of loss but
also distort the incentives of the firms with guaran-
teed liabilities. Government guarantees reduce the
sensitivity of a firm’s debt obligations to the riskiness
of the firm, creating an incentive to take additional
risk. If the firm is financially strong, the benefit to
shareholders from taking additional risk may be small
as shareholders will likely bear most of the losses.
However, if the firm is financially weak, the gain to
shareholders from taking additional risk may be
substantial. Thus, the provision of an explicit, or even
an implicit, government guarantee can change firms’
incentives in ways that create a further need for the
government to monitor their risk taking.
Given the importance of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac and the potential problem generated by implicit
guarantees, the GSEs are supervised for safety and
soundness like commercial banks. The two GSEs’
supervisor is a federal government agency, the Office46 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2002
sophisticated risk-management systems. In sum,
while some important characteristics differ, Freddie
Mac’s use of commercial bank standards as a basis
for comparison seems appropriate.
9
The next section provides a brief overview of
Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s voluntary initia-
tives. Subsequent sections discuss the subordinated
debt, liquidity, and enhanced disclosure initiatives.
An Overview of the Initiatives
F
annie Mae, Freddie Mac, Congressmen Richard
Baker and Paul Kanjorski, and a bipartisan group
of members of Congress announced the voluntary
initiatives in October 2000. In general terms, both
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac agreed to
• issue subordinated debt,
• meet certain liquidity standards,
• enhance their disclosure of interest rate and
credit risk,
• obtain and disclose annual credit ratings, and
• self-implement a risk-based capital standard on
an interim basis.
10
While the discussion below highlights both the
similarities and differences between the housing
GSEs and commercial banks, one important distinc-
tion applies to all of the initiatives relative to banking
standards. That is, once bank supervisors implement
a requirement, individual institutions cannot sus-
pend compliance without supervisory approval. By
contrast, Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac could modify or
suspend any part of their initiatives, for any reason,
without any supervisory consequences precisely




annie Mae and Freddie Mac have committed to
issuing subordinated debt at least twice a year
until the sum of each GSEs’ core capital (essentially,
the book value of equity capital) plus loan-loss
allowance plus subordinated debt equals at least 4 per-
cent of adjusted assets.
12 The key features of the
subordinated debt initiative are provided in the table
on page 48, along with the features of bank subor-
dinated debt that is issued to satisfy regulatory capital
requirements. Fannie Mae priced its initial subordi-
nated debt offering on January 25, 2001, and Freddie
Mac followed suit on March 14, 2001.
13
The purpose of the subordinated debt proposal
is threefold, according to testimony by Fannie Mae
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer Timothy Howard (2001).
14 First, it provides
an incentive for subordinated creditors to monitor a
of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO).
5
However, a variety of concerns have been raised
about the GSEs’ supervision (see Frame and Wall
2002). A legislative initiative in 2000 intended to
address these concerns would have altered the hous-
ing GSEs’ relationship with the federal government
and reorganized their supervisory oversight.
6
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac recently announced
a set of six voluntary initiatives intended to enhance
market discipline, increase liquidity, and improve
transparency. The initiatives are voluntary in the
sense that the actions are not required by either leg-
islation or regulation. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae
proclaim that these initiatives put them on the “van-
guard of evolving global capital, risk management,
and disclosure practices” (2000a). Freddie Mac
goes on to explain that “the package of enhance-
ments derives from and strongly adheres to the most
recent comprehensive risk and capital management
framework set forth by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision.”
7 However, their federal reg-
ulator has expressed concerns about the contribu-
tion of some of the initiatives.
8
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the
voluntary initiatives proposed by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac using current thought and practice
from the banking industry. The banking industry,
which has been studied extensively by regulators
and outside analysts and has a broad experience
with reform, provides a rich starting point for the
analysis. Moreover, the comparison to the Basel
Committee standards suggested by Freddie Mac has
merit. The two housing GSEs are like large commer-
cial banks in that both types of institutions operate
with special governmental privileges and restric-
tions, both are accountable to private shareholders
and federal regulators, and the financial stability of
both may be important to the overall stability of the
financial system. Moreover, both the housing GSEs
and large banks are financial firms that hold some
loans on their balance sheet, securitize other loans,
engage in complex derivative contracts, and have
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have committed to
issuing subordinated debt at least twice a year
until the sum of each GSEs’ core capital plus
loan-loss allowance plus subordinated debt
equals at least 4 percent of adjusted assets.company. Second, the subordinated debt prices will
“crystallize the views of thousands of investors into
a clear signal to policymakers as to how investors
view the company’s financial condition” (Howard
2001). Third, the debt serves “as additional capital
on top of the capital required by statutorily
required minimum levels and its risk-based capital
stress test.” Quoting Moody’s Investor Services,
Howard provides a more precise explanation of the
third purpose, stating that subordinated debt would
“improve senior debtholders’ position in the highly
unlikely event of a liquidation or similar event.”
That is, should either firm encounter financial prob-
lems, the subordinated creditors would reduce or
eliminate the losses borne by senior creditors.
The role of bank subordinated debt. Subor-
dinated debt issued by commercial banking organiza-
tions (hereafter referred to as banks) currently fills all
three roles discussed by Howard (2001). However, the
sense in which it fills the first role is trivial; any cred-
itors that are exposed to credit risk have an incentive
to monitor the borrower. The relevant question is,
1. See Frame and Wall (2002) in this issue of Economic Review for a discussion of the economic issues surrounding the federal
government’s provision of subsidies supporting Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s roles in the secondary mortgage market.
2. The U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (2001) reports that, as of year-end 2000, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac held or
guaranteed 39 percent of all residential mortgages, 48 percent of all single-family conforming mortgages, and 71 percent of
all fixed-rate conforming mortgages. “Conforming mortgage” refers to a loan of a particular size that is eligible for purchase
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. For single-family loans in 2000, the conforming loan limit was $252,700. For 2001 this
amount was $275,000, and in 2002 it is $300,700.
3. Clow (1999) quotes Fannie Mae Treasurer Linda Knight as saying that the idea for the benchmark issue began in the sum-
mer of 1997 when the GSE began looking at U.S. Treasury budget predictions. Boughey and O’Leary (2000) point out that
Fannie Mae announced plans to regularly issue thirty-year debt shortly after the Treasury announced plans to stop issuing
debt at that maturity. The authors quote Fannie Mae Executive Vice President Timothy Howard as saying that the securi-
ties provide investors with “a liquid, high-quality long-duration security at a time when the availability of these securities is
declining.” Euroweek (2000) discusses the potential use of GSE securities as surrogates for U.S. Treasury securities in the
context of their use for pricing other securities. The article notes that “the strongest endorsement of Treasury surrogacy”
would be a futures contract. The article references a proposal to create such a future and then quotes Freddie Mac’s
Lienhard as saying “this is absolutely an indication of the validity of the replacement of Treasury securities.” Agency futures
contracts began trading in March 2000.
4. Stigum says “sponsored agencies such as Fannie Mae . . . are regarded by most people that lend to them as the government
in disguise” (1990, 358). The reasons for this belief are discussed in Frame and Wall (2002).
5. The OFHEO is an independent agency within the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
6. The Housing Finance Regulatory Improvement Act of 2000 (H.R. 3703) was jointly introduced by Richard Baker and James
Leach on February 29, 2000.
7. See www.freddiemac.com/corporate/about/six_commitments/package.html.
8.OFHEO Director Armando Falcon (2000) singled out concerns about (1) the stringency of the self-imposed risk-based
capital rule, (2) the usefulness of subordinated debt as a market discipline tool for GSEs, and (3) the practical effect of the
liquidity provisions.
9. The principal difference between commercial banking organizations and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is that commercial
banks are involved in a far greater set of activities. The two GSEs are primarily exposed to credit and interest rate risk in
the residential mortgage market. While banks typically have some exposure to this market, they also have exposure to devel-
opments in a variety of consumer and commercial markets. Banks’ various exposures require that their risk be measured
along more dimensions, and this requirement, in turn, may also complicate their reporting of risk exposures. On the other
hand, banks’ diversity of activities creates a degree of portfolio diversification that reduces their risk exposure below that
which can be measured on a product-by-product basis. Whether this reduction in risk translates into lower overall risk or
whether banks instead take more risk in their various activities depends on their operating strategy. 
10. Subordinated debt is the lowest-priority claim in the event a firm enters bankruptcy or is put in receivership. That is, the
other creditors of the firm are entitled to have their claims fully paid before the subordinated creditors receive any payment.
11. Such a suspension may have legislative consequences, depending in part on the reason for the suspension.
12. Fannie Mae (2001a) and Freddie Mac (2001b) both indicate that their target capital ratio will include an adjustment equal
to 0.45 percent of off-balance-sheet mortgage-related securities to reflect the risk of securities guaranteed by the firms but
not held in their portfolios. This figure is derived from their minimum capital requirements mandated in the Federal Housing
Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992. 
13. Fannie Mae (2001d) indicated that it had issued $4 billion in subordinated debt and that it anticipated issuing a total of
$12 billion to $15 billion of subordinated debt over the first three years of its subordinated debt program. Freddie Mac
(2001c) indicated that it had issued $3 billion in subordinated debt and that it anticipated issuing a total of $8 billion to $10
billion over the same time horizon. 
14. The points in Howard’s testimony may be found on-line at www.fanniemae.com/news/speeches/speech_166.html. See also testi-
mony by Leland Brendsel, the chairman and chief executive officer of Freddie Mac, at www.freddiemac.com/speeches/brendsel.
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bailed out; otherwise they will not monitor the risk-
iness of the bank because they are not exposed to any
risk. Existing empirical evidence summarized in the
Board of Governor’s study suggests that bank subor-
dinated creditors believe that they are at risk.
The regulations that set the terms under which
bank subordinated debt is counted as capital, sum-
marized in the table along with comparable features
for the GSEs’ initiatives, are designed to protect
senior creditors. The rules for banks and bank hold-
ing companies (BHCs) are similar; the table focuses
What can investors do to discipline banks that are
observed to be increasing their risk exposure? A study
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (1999) discusses three ways in which subordi-
nated debt may exercise discipline over bank risk
taking: (1) directly through the price of the bank’s
funding, (2) indirectly or as derived discipline through
the signal to other market participants, and (3) indi-
rectly or as derived discipline through a signal to bank
supervisors. All three types of discipline depend on
subordinated creditors’ believing that they will not be
BHC regulatory GSE voluntary
capital requirements initiatives requirements
Capital requirements To be well capitalized, BHCs must  Sum of core capital, loan loss 
hold total capital equal to 10 percent  allowances, and subordinated debt 
of risk-weighted exposure. must equal 4 percent of adjusted assets.
Minimum issuance  None; capital requirements may be  None; promised amount may be 
requirements satisfied with equity. However, issuance  satisfied with equity. However, issuance 
is likely for largest BHCs given the  is likely given the relative costs of 
relative costs of debt and equity. debt and equity. GSEs have announced 
schedules for future issuance.
Amount that counts toward  A well capitalized bank with 10 per- No limit under the voluntary 
capital requirements cent capital may count subordinated  initiatives, but OFHEO regulations 
debt up to 2.5 percent of risk- set minimum core capital requirements.
weighted exposure.
Minimum maturity  Original maturity of at least five years. No minimum maturity, but the average 
at issuance maturity of all outstanding debt must be 
at least equal to five years.
Discount applied as the debt  Value included in capital is reduced  No discounting.
issue approaches maturity after the remaining maturity drops 
below five years.
Restrictive covenants that  Not permitted. Not permitted.
could accelerate maturity
Suspension of interest   No suspension of payments by the BHC.   Interest payments suspended if 
payments Critically undercapitalized subsidiary  core capital becomes too low 
banks must suspend payment on    or if, as requested, the U.S. 
that bank’s subordinated debt. Treasury buys the GSE’s obligations.
Resumption of interest  If a subsidiary bank’s payments    The interest payments and interest 
payments are suspended, they may resume     on the deferred payments resume 
when the bank is no longer critically  when the conditions for deferral no 
undercapitalized. longer exist, at the end of five years,
or at maturity of the debt issue.
Note: Banks and the two GSEs are each subject to minimum capital adequacy ratios calculated several different ways, including ratios that
exclude subordinated debt. This table focuses on the most relevant comparison: that of a BHC using subordinated debt to satisfy risk-weight-
ed, total capital regulations and a housing GSE issuing the debt to satisfy the voluntary initiatives. The table summarizes the key require-
ments. The details of capital standards for BHCs (the more relevant set of issuers) may be found at 12 CFR 225, Appendix A, and for sus-
pension of bank interest payments, in Section 131 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act. More details of the GSEs
subordinated initiative may be found at Fannie Mae (2001a) or Freddie Mac (2001b).
TABLE
Subordinated Debt Requirements for a Bank Holding Company (BHC) and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac15. See Benston and Kaufman (1997) for a discussion of PCA.
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on BHC issuance because most public issues are at
the holding company level. These regulations give
supervisors time to intervene and resolve problem
banks by slowing the rate at which subordinated
debt matures and is redeemed. However, these
measures also decrease the effectiveness of market
discipline by slowing the rate at which the bank’s
subordinated debt cost is adjusted in response to
changes in its risk. Given the short-term nature of
most bank assets, a bank can reap the benefits or
suffer the consequences of increased risk exposure
before most of its subordinated creditors can demand
compensation for the increased risk.
Bank subordinated debt may also provide a signal
to other financial market participants that results in
their imposing discipline even if the debt itself
exercises little or no direct discipline. Large depos-
itors, firms seeking lines of credit, and over-the-
counter derivatives counterparties may all demand
higher prices or refuse to deal with a bank that is
signaled to be very risky by the subordinated debt
market. However, if subordinated debt is to make a
significant contribution through this form of indi-
rect discipline, the debt must convey new informa-
tion to other market participants. Whether and to
what extent it does convey such information is an
unanswered empirical question.
Bank subordinated debt may provide indirect dis-
cipline via a signal to supervisors. Bank supervisors
have recently started looking at subordinated debt
yields to supplement their other sources of informa-
tion about the banks, such as financial statements,
confidential information from bank examinations,
and stock prices.
Some proposals have been made to expand the
role of subordinated debt in banking, and the topic
has been studied jointly by the Federal Reserve and
the Treasury Department (see BOG and Treasury
2000). The most ambitious proposals would require
banks to issue subordinated debt and would use sig-
nals from this market to trigger supervisory disci-
pline. Evanoff and Wall (2000) propose using sub-
ordinated debt to trigger supervisory disciplinary
actions under prompt corrective action (PCA).
15
Their argument is not that subordinated debt would
necessarily reveal new information to supervisors
but rather that supervisory forbearance sometimes
results in supervisors’ failing to respond to all avail-
able information. Evanoff and Wall argue that banks
may become financially distressed long before their
problems are reflected in book-value capital ratios,
on which the PCA triggers are based.
Finally, bank subordinated debt does provide a
layer of protection for more senior creditors, includ-
ing depositors and the Federal  Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC). If the FDIC follows its policies,
the subordinated creditors would be bailed out only
if Congress passes a special bill to provide the funds
after the FDIC has already protected other credi-
tors. Thus, subordinated creditors are highly unlike-
ly to be bailed out in the event of a bank’s failure,
and existing regulations slow the rate at which sub-
ordinated debtholders can flee troubled banks.
Subordinated debt’s contribution to Fannie
Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s safety and soundness.
The extent to which subordinated debt issued by
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac contributes to their
safety and soundness largely hinges on the extent
to which investors believe they are at risk and the
extent to which they would actually be at risk in the
event of a failure. At one extreme, if there is no
chance that the implicit safety net will cover subor-
dinated creditors and investors recognize this fact,
the subordinated debt will induce monitoring
because the bondholders will be at risk. The debt
may also provide some direct market discipline with
the degree of discipline depending on its maturity
structure and the amount relative to potential losses.
It may convey some information to other market
participants and the OFHEO; however, most of that
information will also be reflected in its stock price.
Finally, the debt will reduce the government’s liabil-
ity in case of failure. At the other extreme, if the
subordinated debt is almost surely going to be pro-
tected by the government in case of failure and
investors recognize this likelihood, the GSEs’ subor-
dinated debt will be only slightly better than their
senior debt in terms of providing market discipline
and signals to supervisors and in protecting the
government because of the interest deferral provi-
sions in the debt (discussed below).
The question of the extent to which Fannie Mae’s
and Freddie Mac’s subordinated creditors are at risk
arises because it is a matter of conjecture about
which claims, if any, the government would guaran-
tee if either GSE failed. One could argue that if the
subordinated debt issued by the GSEs is similar to
that issued by large commercial banks, then investors
should assign equal probabilities that the federal
government will protect the subordinated creditors
in the two types of entities. However, several differ-
ences could prove important.
One difference is that bank subordinated credi-
tors could be protected by the FDIC whereas GSEs’50 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2002
vency is less than the probability that the senior
debt will be covered. However, investors are unlikely
to conjecture that the probability of protection is
zero.
18 Thus, subordinated debt prices likely reflect
some percentage of the losses they would bear
absent any safety net.
19 Whether this percentage
is high or low is a difficult empirical question.
20
Christenson (2001) reports that the subordinated
creditors’ price carries a significant credit risk pre-
mium relative to senior debt, suggesting that
investors assign a low probability of being protected
by the government.
21 He finds an average yield dif-
ferential of 24 basis points for the two types of
claims. However, Calomiris and Wallison (2001)
attribute this spread to a “liquidity premium,” which
implies that investors may factor prices into a very
high probability of being protected.
22
The subordinated debt issued by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac contains one unusual feature that may
enhance market discipline. It provides that the GSE
must stop paying interest on the subordinated debt
and suspend dividend payments if its capital expe-
riences a sufficiently large drop. While the deferral
of interest may make investors more sensitive to the
GSEs’ credit risk and provide the GSEs with a tem-
porary reduction in cash outflow during distress
situations, some important provisions may reduce
a deferral’s effectiveness in practice.
23 First, the
deferral provision relies on book value capital ratios,
which may not accurately reflect the degree of finan-
cial distress. Second, the interest payments are only
deferred and are due (with interest) in five years or
at maturity, whichever comes first.
24
An alternative approach, suggested by OFHEO
director Armando Falcon (2000), would be to require
holders of subordinated debt issued by Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac to convert their debt to equity in
the event of financial distress, thereby placing sub-
ordinated creditors at greater risk.
25 Fannie Mae
(2001d) argues that the market for such “convert-
ible bonds” is less liquid and more influenced by the
stock market and hence would send a less reliable
signal. The firm also argues that its ability to issue
equity would be impaired if its subordinated debt
were convertible.
26
The bottom line on the subordinated debt initia-
tive depends in large part on two related issues.
First, the amount of direct and indirect discipline
that subordinated debt may exert depends to a sub-
stantial degree on the probability assigned by sub-
ordinated creditors to the prospect that they will be
protected in case of failure. Second, the amount of
protection afforded to taxpayers by the subordinated
debt depends on whether subordinated creditors
subordinated creditors will be protected only in the
event of an act of Congress. However, the probabil-
ity that bank subordinated creditors will be protected
without congressional action appears slight because
the FDIC has consistently refused to protect subor-
dinated creditors and any such protection would
require the approval of the U.S. Treasury and the
Federal Reserve Board under the FDIC Improve-
ment Act (FDICIA).
16 If the FDIC does not protect
them, a bank’s subordinated creditors would need
to seek special legislation just like the GSE’s subor-
dinated creditors. 
In contrast, congressional action is necessary
before any GSE creditor would be protected from loss
by the federal government. As Frame and Wall (2002)
discuss, the GSEs’ senior creditors appear reasonably
confident that such a bill would be introduced and
passed. Thus, rather than having to promote special
legislation, a GSE’s subordinated creditors face a
possibly easier task of attaching an amendment pro-
tecting them to any bill designed to protect senior
creditors. The OFHEO would almost surely offer a
recommendation to Congress on any request for
assistance to GSE subordinated creditors, and such
an opinion may carry significant weight, especially if
the agency has appointed (or soon would appoint) a
conservator. Whether the OFHEO would recommend
assisting the subordinated creditors if a GSE became
financially distressed is unclear since the agency has
never faced a similar issue. 
Another possible advantage for the GSEs’ subor-
dinated creditors is that they may receive payment
as their debt matures under circumstances in which
bank subordinated creditors would be wiped out. If,
as Carnell (2001) argues, the OFHEO lacks the
power to appoint a receiver, then the GSE or its
conservator would be obligated to continue paying
on the subordinated debt when it matures unless
Congress authorized a receiver.
17
Thus, reasonable investors may conjecture that
the probability that the GSEs’ subordinated debt
will be repaid at maturity in case of economic insol-
To construct its liquid securities portfolio,
Fannie Mae has said that it will hold 
nonmortgage-related securities equal to 
5 percent of on-balance-sheet assets.51 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2002
16. See Bean and Bovenzi (1998) for a discussion of the current treatment of various classes of creditors at closed banks and
McDermott and others (1998) for a review of the resolution of several large banks. The FDIC fully protected the subordinated
creditors at Continental Illinois in 1984. As a part of its open bank assistance to some large Texas banking organizations in the
1980s, the FDIC also provided partial coverage to bank subordinated creditors and assisted bank holding company (BHC)
creditors to the extent that it allowed the banks to continue making payments to the BHC. However, the discussion in
McDermott and others suggests that subordinated creditors were not protected after the agency became a receiver for a failed
bank. Further, the FDIC has made operational changes and obtained additional powers since providing open bank assistance
to the large Texas banks that McDermott and others suggest would reduce the likelihood of subordinated creditors benefit-
ing in future large bank failures.
17. In a comment included with a U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report, Freddie Mac argues that a federal district court
“could appoint a receiver for Freddie Mac under common law practice” (GAO 1990, 93). Carnell (2001) argues that a federal
instrumentality cannot be a debtor in federal bankruptcy court. A definite answer could only come from the courts in the
event that someone sought to have one of the GSEs put into bankruptcy.
18. The term “economic insolvency” is used here to indicate that the fair value of the GSEs’ assets is less than the fair value of
their liabilities.
19. This risk is that subordinated creditors will not be paid the full amount of principal and interest as well as the risk that these
creditors will receive delayed interest payments.
20. One possible indication that subordinated debt issues were perceived to be substantially riskier than senior issues would be
that bond mutual funds appeared to distinguish between the two types of issues. At least one fund, Fidelity Intermediate
Government Income Fund, does not appear to be distinguishing between the two types of debt in its information to
investors. Fidelity (2001) lists the holdings of the fund, including a variety of securities from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
The holdings include two issues from Fannie Mae and one from Freddie Mac that have coupon rates and maturity dates that
are identical to those of the respective GSEs’ subordinated debt but are not labeled as subordinated debt. The failure to dis-
tinguish is suggestive of investors’ views but is not conclusive evidence. The fact that these securities are not separately
identified does not necessarily imply that the fund manager views the securities as being of equal risk with the GSEs’ senior
securities, but it does suggest that the managers did not think it necessary to draw investors’ attention to the difference. 
21. The difference in GSE subordinated debt yield spreads over their senior debt yields could be compared to similar spreads
for banks. Fahey (2001, 24) provides such a comparison but also notes one important difference: bank senior debt is a rel-
atively junior claim on the firm’s assets (it ranks behind deposits) whereas the GSEs’ senior debt is “the senior claimant.”
Another potential difference is that bank subordinated debt may be a more liquid claim than bank senior debt. Indeed, Board
of Governors (1999) finds that bank subordinated debt is one of the most liquid types of corporate debt issues because of
its frequent issuance and lack of complicating features. Birchler and Hancock (2000) examine the spreads of bank senior
and subordinated debt. However, their focus is on the time series determinants of the spreads rather than on the magnitude
of the credit risk premium.
22. Christenson (2001) argues that the two GSEs plan to issue sufficient subordinated debt so that the liquidity premium should
be tiny. Fahey (2001, 17) quotes a study by the investment banking firm Goldman Sachs released before the first Fannie Mae
subordinated debt issuance as estimating that the liquidity premium would be from 3 to 7 basis points of an anticipated
spread of 15 to 26 basis points. A counterargument is that the liquidity premium may be substantial even if the original issue
is large. For example, Amihud and Mendelson (1991) examine the liquidity premium in the Treasury market. Comparing
notes and bills with three months to maturity, they find a 30 basis point average difference in yields. Thus, the relative pro-
portion of the subordinated debt premium due to liquidity versus credit risk remains an open empirical question.
23. Fannie Mae (2001c, 8) also points out that taxable investors may incur a tax liability on accrued interest even though the
actual payment of the interest is deferred. This risk may further increase the cost of the debt because taxable investors may
demand a further premium to compensate for this difference in the timing of the receipt of interest on the subordinated debt
and the payment of tax liabilities to the Internal Revenue Service.
24. While subordinated creditors will demand compensation for the risk of interest deferral, they will not demand compensation for
the actual loss of the interest payments to the extent they believe likely to be protected by taxpayer funds in case of a failure.
The deferral of interest payments makes the subordinated debt in many ways like limited-life, cumulative preferred stock. The
potential for taxpayers to incur a tax liability prior to receipt of the interest is explicitly discussed in Fannie Mae (2001c, 8).
25. Another alternative that may be more credible with investors is a mandatory haircut in the event of a congressional bailout
as discussed by Stern (2000). See the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (2001b) for an alternative proposal designed
to ensure that the GSEs’ subordinated debt issues would result in effective market discipline.
26. The merits of Fannie Mae’s arguments against the conversion requirement hinge on several issues. First, Falcon’s proposal
does not necessarily require that the debtholders be given the option of converting, only that the option be automatically
exercised if a GSE’s capital adequacy ratios become sufficiently small. Thus, comparisons with exiting convertible securities,
which give debtholders the option to convert their debt into equity, may not be merited—particularly with regard to Fannie
Mae’s ability to issue new equity. Second, as noted above, the current reliability of the signal is questionable because it’s
unclear that any of Fannie Mae’s or Freddie Mac’s creditors would suffer losses should one of these firms become insolvent.
A forced conversion feature would clearly put subordinated creditors in a position of risk and thus remove any doubts about
whether these securities include a premium for the risk of failure by the issuer. Finally, while the threat of forced conver-
sion may raise the cost of issuing new equity, it would not prevent either GSE from issuing new shares if it became finan-
cially distressed. 52 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2002
Committee issued a set of general recommenda-
tions for measuring and managing liquidity risk within
the bounds of banks’ current assets and liabilities.
However, the committee did not recommend that
banks maintain sufficient liquidity to survive ex-
tended periods without access to financial markets.
The nature of the liquidity concern addressed by
this initiative is unclear. Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac provide liquidity to the mortgage markets in
ways that are somewhat similar to bank loan com-
mitments. However, the GSEs do not face the same
potential for a sudden large unexpected reduction
in their liabilities because they do not issue demand
deposits. Further, the implicit government guaran-
tee provides Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with
access to the financial markets on terms at least as
good as those of any fully private firm. Indeed, if the
housing GSEs were suffering a pure liquidity problem
that lasted three months, then most other U.S. cor-
porations would almost surely be facing the same
problem, with very adverse implications for the real
economy.
28 Furthermore, if Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac could not issue their securities for reasons
solely related to market liquidity, the securities held
in their portfolio would also likely be illiquid.
29
To construct its liquid securities portfolio, Fannie
Mae has said that it will hold nonmortgage-related
securities equal to 5 percent of on-balance-sheet
assets.
30 Not only is the necessity of maintaining
such a large portfolio of liquid securities unclear, but
government officials have raised questions about
the desirability of the GSEs’ nonmortgage-related
investments.
31 The policy issue in this case is that
GSEs borrow at favorable interest rates because of
their implicit government guarantee and then pur-
chase securities issued by fully private firms (with
higher interest rates) in order to earn the credit
spread. The U.S. General Accounting Office (1998)
views this practice as an “arbitrage” that benefits the
GSEs’ shareholders but may not always serve the
public purposes expressed in their federal charters
and therefore should be limited by regulation.
Enhanced Disclosures
I
n announcing the package of enhanced disclosure
measures, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae (2000b)
pointed to standards being promoted by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision for commercial
banks.
32 Enhanced transparency should allow the
market to better identify financially weak institu-
tions. Thus, the relevant issue for evaluating Fannie
Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s commitment to enhanced
disclosure is the extent to which such measures will
improve the market’s understanding of the GSEs’ risk
would, in fact, be protected if a failure should occur.
Unfortunately, the first question is difficult to
answer, and the second can be answered only in the
event of a failure. One problem in answering the
first question arises because investors may assign a
probability greater than zero of being protected.
For example, suppose investors in GSE subordinated
debt assigned a 50 percent probability of being pro-
tected by the federal government in the event that
a GSE became insolvent and accordingly demanded
a credit risk premium equal to one-half the premium
they would otherwise demand. Such a credit risk
premium would be reflected in subordinated debt
yields, but the premium would still be significantly
below that which would appear in the absence of
any prospect of government support.
27 The second
problem is that of determining the extent to which
any differences in yields between senior and subor-
dinated debt reflect credit risk versus some other
factor such as a liquidity premium.
Liquidity
F
annie Mae and Freddie Mac have committed to
following the “Sound Practices for Managing
Liquidity in Banking Organisations” set forth by the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000b).
These GSEs have also promised to maintain liquidity
sufficient to continue in operation for more than three
months with no access to the public debt markets.
The Basel Committee issued its statement on
sound liquidity practices because liquidity man-
agement is a core function of commercial banks.
Indeed, a significant portion of bank funding is com-
posed of demand deposits, and banks often make
commitments to certain borrowers to provide loans
upon request. Thus, an individual bank’s liquidity
position is subject to large, unexpected changes on
a daily and even intraday basis. To accommodate
these requests, banks hold some overnight reserves
and short-term liquid assets. In addition, banks often
maintain lines of credit with other financial institu-
tions and raise funds in public markets. The Basel
The relevant issue for evaluating Fannie
Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s commitment to
enhanced disclosure is the extent to which
such measures will improve the market’s
understanding of the GSEs’ risk exposures.27. Sophisticated analysts’ ability to infer the market’s true evaluation of the GSEs would not be impaired if investors assigned
a constant probability of being protected. Less sophisticated observers may draw incorrect inferences about a GSE’s risk
level if they do not adjust for the probability of creditors being protected.
28. Recent events suggest that severe liquidity shocks are unlikely to be ignored by policymakers for three months. The ter-
rorists attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York City occurred in the midst of the financial district and hit U.S. financial
markets especially hard. Raghavan, Pulliam, and Opdyke (2001) report that, in these circumstances, the Federal Reserve
immediately changed its conduct of monetary policy to substantially increase the supply of reserves until markets returned
to normal.
29. An alternative scenario in which one of the GSEs could not issue securities for three months could occur if one of them
became financially distressed and market participants believed it likely that Congress would not guarantee the distressed
firm’s debt in the event of failure. However, if the GSEs were being held to banklike standards, then the current standard for
banks would suggest that prompt action, rather than a three-month delay, might be more appropriate. The prompt correc-
tive action provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act mandate early action by bank super-
visors to address financial weakness at banks and the resolution of banks that cannot rebuild their capital.
30. Currently, the GSEs’ nonmortgage investment portfolios consist primarily of cash and cash equivalents, asset-backed secu-
rities, corporate debt, and federal funds.
31. For example, former House Banking Committee Chairman James Leach raised concerns about Freddie Mac’s purchase of
bonds issued by Philip Morris and the significant nonmortgage-related holdings of the Federal Home Loan Banks (Leach
1997). Also, HUD issued an advanced notice of proposed rule making (62 Fed. Reg. 68059-68061) in December 1997 that
solicited opinions about the future regulation of the nonmortgage investments of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
32. See the Basel Committee (2000a) for a revised version of the capital proposal that includes new disclosure requirements as
part of its “Market Discipline” pillar.
33. For example, the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (often called the Call Report) for the quarter ending
September 2001 may be found at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/reportforms/forms/FR_Y-9C20010926. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac also present audited annual reports that conform to GAAP. 
34. Thus, mortgage prepayments accelerate when interest rates fall and slow when interest rates rise. An increase in the vari-
ance of interest rates does not provide an immediate opportunity to refinance at lower interest rates but does increase the
probability that rates will fall sufficiently in the future to make prepayment profitable to the borrower.
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exposures. The following discussions examine the
contributions of each of the disclosure commitments
in light of current practice for the banking industry.
Credit risk. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have
promised to disclose a forward-looking measure of
their credit exposure under which housing prices,
by assumption, immediately decline by 5 percent
and the net present value of credit losses are mea-
sured over a ten-year period. The decline in housing
values is then used in these GSEs’ internal stress-
test models to provide an estimate of both gross
credit losses and losses net of recoveries from pri-
vate mortgage insurance and other credit enhance-
ments over the ten-year period. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac also provide contemporaneous and his-
torical information on credit losses as well as
descriptive information about their portfolios.
Banks currently provide detailed information
about the categories of loans in their portfolios,
the extent to which borrowers are behind on inter-
est and principal (by category), and historical infor-
mation on credit losses (by category). Although some
banks may go beyond the minimum requirements,
much of the information on loan quality is pro-
vided in response to generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) requirements and mandatory
reports filed with bank supervisors.
33 Banks do
not routinely provide scenario-driven estimates of
potential losses of the sort that Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac provide.
Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac provide
more information, credit risk is generally more
important to banks. The OFHEO (2000) indicates
that the two GSEs reported credit losses of less
than 0.02 percent of their respective average total
mortgage portfolios in 1999. While 1999 may simply
have been a good year, these figures are far below
typical commercial bank credit losses.
Interest rate risk. Properly measuring and
managing interest rate risk is critical for any
investor in mortgages or mortgage-backed securi-
ties, including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Interest rate risk arises from these assets because
of their relatively long maturities, which make their
market values more sensitive to changes in interest
rates than short-term and floating-rate obligations.
Moreover, most fixed-rate mortgages provide the
borrower with the option to repay the loan at any
time. Indeed, this prepayment option becomes
increasingly valuable as market interest rates fall
below the contract interest rate on the mortgage
and as the variability of interest rates increase.
34
To measure interest rate risk, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac use complex models of the term struc-
ture of interest rates and mortgage prepayments.
They also use sophisticated financial instruments54 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2002
rates. However, duration analysis is not well designed
to measure changes in portfolio value due to large
interest rate movements, nor does it necessarily
provide a good measure of risk for a portfolio with
many embedded options.
35
The types of interest rate disclosure that Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac have committed to are sim-
ilar to those proposed by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (2000a). Currently, publicly
traded banks must discuss their interest rate risk-
management policy in their annual report, and
many provide an exposure measure. However, we
are not aware of any bank that has committed to
monthly release of interest rate risk measures for
the overall firm.
The largest banks often engage in trading oper-
ations under which they routinely buy and sell a
variety of financial instruments that may contain
significant interest rate risk exposures. Risk mea-
surement in trading operations is particularly im-
portant for banks because of the ease of changing
the riskiness of the trading book. Risk measurement
is also somewhat easier for these claims because
value estimates can be derived using actual prices
rather than internal estimates of what the prices
would have been if the asset traded.
36 One com-
monly used measure of risk in banks’ trading books
is called value at risk (VaR).
37 VaR estimates the
maximum loss in portfolio value that would be
incurred at a given probability level. 
Banks have been disclosing the risk exposure of
their trading books in a variety of formats. Given the
importance and feasibility of providing such mea-
sures, the private-sector Working Group on Public
Disclosure (2001) issued a report recommending
that firms disclose certain VaR on a quarterly basis.
These included the aggregate high, average, and
low VaR; VaR by major risk category; and quantifi-
cation of the extent to which the risk estimated by
their VaR models corresponded with daily trading
revenues. The Working Group’s efforts were sup-
ported by the Federal Reserve, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, and the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and these regulatory agen-
cies each encouraged the financial firms under their
jurisdiction to consider using the recommendations.
Although the recommended disclosure is historical
in nature, it limits a bank’s ability to affect percep-
tions by engaging in window dressing around the
reporting date.
38
In contrast to banks’ using VaR for their trading
books, the new disclosures by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac reveal the maximum loss in interest
income for a specific interest rate movement. While
with embedded options that are intended to allow
them to offset changes in prepayments due to
changes in interest rates. In short, while credit risk
has historically been relatively small for Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, the riskiness of their portfolios
cannot be fairly assessed without an understanding
of their exposure to interest rate risk.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have provided some
historical interest rate risk exposure in their quar-
terly and annual financial statements. As a part of
the initiatives, they promised to disclose—on a
monthly basis—projections of their net income and
asset values over time under certain interest rate
changes. The first two interest rate scenarios involve
an immediate 50 basis point increase or decrease in
the level of interest rates across the yield curve.
Each GSE then discloses the result of the scenario
that has the more adverse impact. Two other interest
rate scenarios examined are an immediate 25 basis
points increase or decrease in the slope of the term
structure between the one-year and ten-year matu-
rities. Again, the result from the scenario with the
more adverse impact is disclosed. These simula-
tions are intended to cover a broad range of possi-
ble outcomes, as Fannie Mae (2001b) notes: “over
the company’s monthly reporting period, a 50 basis
point change in interest rates and 25 basis point
change in the slope of the yield curve encompass
about 95 percent of the actual changes that are likely
to occur.” However, this range still leaves open the
probability that the actual change will exceed the
simulated changes in one month for every two
years. Moreover, the change in the portfolio’s value
could be large given the nonlinearity of returns
inherent in mortgage portfolios.
Fannie Mae is also providing monthly informa-
tion about the gap between the duration of its
assets and its liabilities. Duration is a measure of
the weighted-average time to maturity of a claim’s
cash flows. Duration may also be viewed as a mea-
sure of the change in asset values arising from a
small parallel shift in the term structure of interest
Measuring and managing interest rate risk
is probably the most important financial risk
management issue facing Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.35. See Cohen (1993) for a discussion of duration analysis and its limitations.
36. Markets for many bank loans held outside the trading book, that is, in the “banking book,” are either nonexistent or have
existed for only a relatively short period of time. 
37. See Simons (1996) for a general discussion of value at risk. Jorion (2001) analyzes the value of bank disclosures of value at
risk. As part of risk management, banks also routinely engage in stress testing in which they analyze their exposure to
extreme (and prolonged) market movements. Further, some banks disclose the worst-case results from such tests. However,
such disclosures typically do not include information on the scenario generating the worst-case results, and the worst-case
scenario will likely vary over time with changes in the bank’s portfolio.
38. While any firm may engage in window dressing, it is especially easy for financial firms because they can enter short-term
transactions that are effective over a reporting date but expire shortly thereafter.
39. One limitation of VaR is that it does not provide any measure of the probability of losses substantially in excess of its VaR.
For example, the VaR indicating the maximum loss that will occur with 5 percent probability provides only a lower bound
on the loss that will occur with 1 percent probability.
40. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also provide some analysis of changes in the market value of their portfolios in their annual
reports. Fannie Mae’s 2000 annual report discloses its market value exposure to a 100 basis point shift in the term structure
of interest rates. Similarly, Freddie Mac discloses the sensitivity of its portfolio market value to an immediate 50 basis point
shift in the term structure and also provides a chart showing the number of business days of varying degrees of exposure
over the prior year. These disclosures are similar to banks’ VaR disclosures in that they focus on market values, but, unlike
the VaR disclosures, they provide information for only two possible interest rate scenarios. 
41. See Kane (1989) for a discussion of the importance of focusing on the economic values of portfolios rather than on account-
ing values such as net income.
42. NRSROs are more commonly referred to in the bond markets as the “rating agencies,” such as Moody’s and Standard and
Poor’s. Freddie Mac (2001a) extended its promise and says that Standard and Poor’s will update ratings on a continuous or
“surveillance” basis.
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VaR has its own set of limitations, it is a superior
risk measure to that offered by the GSEs in their
voluntary initiatives because VaR incorporates
information about the entire distribution of returns
rather than the values for a small set of discrete out-
comes.
39 The selection of a small number of possible
interest rate outcomes could be misleading when a
firm’s change in value is not a linear (and possibly
not even a monotonic) function of changes in inter-
est rates. For example, a financial institution could
be perfectly hedged against a 50 basis point increase
in interest rates but might suffer substantial losses
from a 40 or 75 basis point movement.
40
VaR, like the portfolio-market-value-sensitivity
(PMVS) measure used by Freddie Mac, also has an
important advantage over the net-interest-income-
at-risk measure used by Fannie Mae. Net interest
income is an accounting measure that may not fully
reflect changes in market values whereas both VaR
and PMVS seek to measure market values. Fannie
Mae partially compensates for this limitation by giv-
ing the change in net interest income over both
one- and four-year horizons. However, market value
is a more accurate indicator of financial health as
the thrift debacle in the 1980s demonstrated.
41
Measuring and managing interest rate risk is
probably the most important financial risk manage-
ment issue facing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The
new disclosures will provide financial market par-
ticipants with new information about some aspects
of the GSEs’ rate exposure. However, the interest
rate disclosures focus only on a small set of interest
rate outcomes and may fairly reflect exposure around
these outcomes. The use of measures that more
fully reflect the range of exposures and that focus
on market values would reduce the potential gap
between the information in the voluntary disclo-
sures and the true extent of each GSE’s interest
rate exposure.
Annual rating. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
have committed to obtain and disclose an annual
rating of their risk to the government from a na-
tionally recognized statistical rating organization
(NRSRO).
42 Both GSEs have obtained such ratings
from Standard and Poor’s (S&P). The benefit to the
OFHEO of this rating is not obvious because the
supervisor should have at least as good access to
the underlying information as the rating agencies.
However, the rating signal may help other analysts
that are monitoring the performance of the GSEs.
Banking organizations are not currently required
to obtain such a rating, but any bank that wishes to
publicly issue a debt obligation will almost surely
obtain a rating for its debt. As a result, virtually all
large banking organizations have ratings for the par-
ent or some subsidiary or both.
The information content of the NRSROs’ ratings is
most easily understood in the context of a nonfinan-
cial firm issuing a bond to private investors. In this
case, the rating focuses exclusively on the credit
quality of the issuer; an important contribution of the
rating is that the rater’s credibility with investors can56 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2002
private sector participants, who may continue to
focus on the implicit guarantee. These arguments
do not imply that the NRSRO would face no conse-
quences from issuing too high a rating. Financial
distress on the part of one of the GSEs would be a
widely followed event. A credit rating that did not
accurately reflect the GSE’s problems would likely
generate substantial adverse publicity for the NRSRO
and might raise concern about the quality of the
agency’s other ratings. 
Thus, the ratings of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
likely will convey some useful information to out-
side analysts. However, the information content of
the ratings may be misunderstood unless the user
realizes that the ratings are prepared on different
terms and for a different audience than the NRSROs’
typical ratings.
Interim risk-based capital stress test. Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac also promised to implement a
version of the OFHEO’s proposed risk-based capital
rule and to announce the calculated risk-based cap-
ital ratios. The two GSEs used the original OFHEO
risk-based capital stress test model with some
adjustments to reflect their suggested revisions.
These revisions primarily relate to aspects of the
risk-based capital proposal that the two firms
believed overestimated their risks and hence their
required capital. The commitment to announce cal-
culated risk-based capital ratios expired when the
OFHEO published its final risk-based capital rule on
September 13, 2001. Nevertheless, the two GSEs
appear to be continuing to provide updates until the
final rule becomes legally binding one year after
publication. The final rule incorporates some of the
two firms’ proposed adjustments.
In a related development, Stiglitz, Orszag, and
Orszag (2002) argue that the probability that the
government will be called upon to assist one of the
two GSEs is extremely low given the risk-based cap-
ital standard imposed on Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. The version of the standard they focus on
specifies a stress test of a 600 basis point movement
upward and a 600 basis point movement downward
in the ten-year constant maturity Treasury rate, and
it includes specific assumptions about the move-
ment of the rest of the yield curve.
45 When the paper
simulated three million interest rate scenarios from
a variety of starting points, in only 0.01 percent of
the simulations did interest rates fall 600 basis
points and remain down for ten years. The propor-
tion of scenarios with upward movements of 600 basis
point that last for ten years is substantially lower.
None of their simulations resulted in the combina-
tion of a 600 basis point movement and the related
enhance the bond’s marketability. The ratings of the
GSEs’ risk to the government is different in that the
GSEs have an extensive relationship to the govern-
ment and the rating is intended for the government’s
use. Both of these differences have the potential to
change the information contained in the rating.
In describing S&P’s methodology for the stand-
alone rating of GSEs, Beers and others (2001) note
that governments are often intricately involved with
GSEs in ways that both enhance and constrain their
financial performance. In these cases, the authors
argue that “assuming a sudden and complete strip-
ping away of all forms of government influence may
be neither practical nor informative.” Instead, Beers
and others (2001) say that stand-alone ratings are
done on the “basis of that entity’s existing business
profile and financial position, including whatever
government support or intervention the entity typi-
cally enjoys in the normal course of business, but
excluding credit for any extraordinary government
assistance that might be expected in the event of a
crisis.” Thus, while the stand-alone ratings of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac contain additional information
about their respective credit quality, the term
“stand-alone” needs to be understood in the context
of all of the normal benefits and costs the two firms
receive as a result of being government sponsored.
The issue of relying on NRSRO ratings primarily
for regulatory purposes, rather than to inform pri-
vate investors, has arisen in the context of banking
regulations. The Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision (2000a) has proposed the use of NRSRO
credit ratings of a bank’s large counterparties to
set capital requirements under the “standardized
approach.”
43 Many independent analysts have ex-
pressed concern about this proposal because it
could create a conflict of interest.
44 Specifically,
NRSROs are paid for their ratings by the borrower
and therefore have an incentive to assign higher
ratings than are merited. The primary inducement
for NRSROs to provide accurate ratings is that
investors would stop using these ratings if the
information on borrowers’ riskiness were not accu-
rate. However, if the principal user of some ratings
were a government agency, then an NRSRO would
not face such market pressure. Thus, supervisory
reliance on credit ratings could undercut these
ratings’ objectivity and accuracy.
The use of ratings to evaluate the risk to the fed-
eral government from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
poses a similar problem. First, the buyer of the rating
is the party with the greatest incentive to demand
an inflated rating. Second, the rating is produced
for the benefit of the government overseer and not57 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2002
yield curve change specified in the risk-based cap-
ital standard. Given the results of their analysis,
Stiglitz, Orszag, and Orszag (2002, 6) conclude that
if “the GSEs hold sufficient capital to withstand the
stress test, the implication is that the expected cost
to the government of providing an explicit govern-
ment guarantee on $1 trillion in GSE debt is just
$2 million.”
While the exact probability estimates of Stiglitz,
Orszag, and Orszag (2002) depend on their specific
interest rate model, the probability of a 600 basis
point shock that lasts ten years is likely to be remote
in any model calibrated to the historical movements
of the U.S. term structure. However, as was previ-
ously discussed, a financial firm may be perfectly
hedged to a 600 basis point movement but be at sub-
stantial risk from a smaller movement. For example,
a firm could buy a deep-out-of-the-money option to
cover the losses from any movement greater than
575 basis points but be exposed to crippling losses
from a 500 basis point movement.
46 Thus, even if the
two GSEs could withstand a 600 basis point move-
ment and the probability of a larger movement is
tiny, these factors would not necessarily imply that
the GSEs’ risk of default is virtually zero. The use of
an interest rate risk measure that more fully reflects
the losses from a range of interest rate scenarios
would help avoid the pitfalls associated with analyz-
ing any single interest rate scenario.
47
Implications of the new disclosures. Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, like commercial banks, have
enhanced their disclosures. However, room for
improvement remains for both the banks and the
two GSEs.
48 An important part of any package to
improve disclosure should be a reduction in the dis-
closing firm’s ability to manage its reported risk fig-
ures in a way that understates its risk exposure.
49
For banks, credit risk is typically their most impor-
tant exposure, suggesting that good measures of
credit risk are especially important for them. For
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, interest rate risk is most
important, and there are opportunities for improving
their disclosure in this area. In particular, the public’s
understanding of the GSEs’ interest rate risk exposure
would be improved by the reporting of measures that
reveal more about the distribution of risks, such as
those produced by VaR. The understanding of Fannie
Mae’s risk exposure could also be improved by a focus
on market values rather than accounting values, as is
currently done by Freddie Mac.
Conclusions
I
n 2000, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac announced a
series of voluntary initiatives intended to improve
their financial stability and make their risk positions
more transparent. The initiative to regularly issue sub-
ordinated debt provides a cushion to protect senior
debtholders. The extent to which this debt accurately
conveys market perceptions of the firms’ risk will
depend on the extent to which investors believe the
subordinated debt also has an implicit guarantee. 
A second initiative by Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac would enhance their liquidity position. While
liquidity is important to all firms, the GSEs’ compar-
ison of their initiative with international standards
for banks seems misplaced. Liquidity management is
43. Under the Basel Committee’s (2000a) proposal for internationally active banks, an institution may choose to use an internal
ratings-based approach if its system passes certain standards. Otherwise, the banks must use the standardized approach, in
which the supervisors supply the risk weightings for various categories of assets based in part on NRSRO credit ratings.
44. For example, see the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (2001a). Concerns have also been expressed by the rating
agencies themselves—for example, Moody’s Investor Services (2000).
45. The Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 actual standard allows the consideration of
smaller declines in interest rates and greater increases in interest rates, depending on the level of interest rates over the
prior three years.
46. Fannie Mae failed the then current version of the OFHEO’s proposed risk-based capital regulation by $3.68 billion on June 30,
1997. In 1999 congressional testimony, the acting OFHEO Director Mark Kinsey quotes Fannie Mae’s chief financial officer
as stating that the risk could be reduced “in a variety of ways at an annual cost of about $70 million.” He further quotes
Fannie Mae’s CFO as saying that investors would “see no perceptible change in the company’s future financial performance”
as a result of it complying with the capital standard. While Kinsey does not elaborate on the “variety of ways” of solving a
$3.68 billion capital gap with an annual expenditure of $70 million, the use of various types of financial contracts that include
deep-out-of-the-money options would be one low-cost method that would not necessarily impose other significant changes
on the firm’s financial performance. Indeed, Stiglitz, Orszag, and Orszag’s (2002) results explain why options to cover such
extreme movements would be relatively low cost. The probability that interest rates will move sufficiently to bring these
options into the money is extremely low.
47. As was the case with the interest rate risk disclosures, one possible alternative measure is VaR.  
48. See Eisenbeis and Wall (2002) for a discussion of the importance of improved transparency of banks.
49. Accurate disclosure may be especially important for firms regulated and backed by the government. Kane (1997) discusses
the reasons for (and danger of) government officials accepting misleading disclosures.58 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2002
Finally, the remaining four initiatives are intended
to improve the transparency of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. These initiatives will add to the infor-
mation available to market participants on the two
GSEs. However, the scenario-based interest rate
risk measure used in the disclosure initiative is not
as comprehensive as would be desirable.
a core function of commercial banks because their
assets and liabilities are short-term, but the GSEs’
assets and liabilities are longer-term. Furthermore,
the nonmortgage investment portfolios that Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac maintain have been criticized
by some because the GSEs preferred credit market
access generates credit spread profits. 
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